Operation Black Arrow

Operation Black Arrow
Part of the Retribution operations

Five fedayeen marauders killed by Israeli border police in chase after attack near Nir Galim.
Date February 28, 1955
Location Gaza
Result Israeli victory
Belligerents
Israel  Egypt
Commanders and leaders
Ariel Sharon
Danny Matt
Aharon Davidi
Casualties and losses
8 killed 38 killed

Operation Black Arrow (Hebrew: חץ שחורHetz Shachor) was an Israeli military operation carried out in Gaza (while under Egyptian control) on 28 February 1955. The operation targeted the Egyptian army. Thirty-eight Egyptian soldiers were killed during the operation as were eight Israelis.[1]

Contents

Background

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War resulted in a decisive Israeli victory. However, the Arab nations remained intransigent and were only willing to sign armistice agreements with Israel. Thus, a static situation of “no war, no peace,” emerged. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees now camped alongside Israel’s porous borders. The refugees lived in squalor, were kept under martial law and were prevented from gaining citizenship in their respective Arab host countries.[2] Arab governments, but in particular Egypt, sensing the refugees’ discontent, capitalized on the opportunity to recruit embittered Palestinians for terrorist actions against Israel. At first, the infiltrations and border transgressions took the form of petty banditry and thievery.[3] However, by 1954, Egyptian military intelligence was taking an active role in providing various forms of support for Palestinian (Fedayeen) terrorist activity.[4] After one such atrocity, Israel decided to take decisive action against Egypt for its sponsorship of terror and initiated Operation Black Arrow.

Casus Belli

On February 25, 1955 Arab infiltrators murdered an Israeli civilian in the town of Rechovot.[5][6][7] One of the terrorists who was pursued and killed by Israeli forces was found to be in possession of documents linking him to Egyptian military intelligence.[5] Defense Minister David Ben Gurion and Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan demanded a harsh response directed against those believed to have sponsored the atrocity. Prime Minister Moshe Sharett was more hesitant but demurred.

The attack

On February 28, Ariel Sharon, commander of the Paratroop Brigade was issued the go ahead to initiate Operation Black Arrow. That night, a force of 150 paratroops, led by Aharon Davidi and Danny Matt attacked an Egyptian army base near the city of Gaza.[5] An Egyptian military relief convoy was ambushed in route. In total, between thirty-seven[5] and thirty-eight[8] Egyptian soldiers were killed and many more injured for the loss of eight Israelis.

Aftermath

In Egypt there was a sense of humiliation. Not since the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 had the Egyptians suffered such a humiliating blow.[9] Egypt decided to ratchet up its sponsorship of Palestinian terror infiltrations which invited even harsher Israeli retaliatory raids such as Operation Elkayam (72 Egyptian KIA) and Operation Volcano (81 Egyptian KIA, 55 captured).[10] Ultimately, Egyptian provocations such as terror sponsorship and the closure of the Gulf of Eilat to Israeli shipping and air traffic were factors that led to Operation Kadesh in which the Egyptian army was soundly defeated and its Fedayeen bases disbanded.[11]

References

  1. ^ Spencer Tucker, The encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli conflict, ABC-CLIO, (2008) p.1162
  2. ^ Zeev Schiff, History of the Israeli Army, Straight Arrow Books (1974), p 220-222
  3. ^ Schiff, p.222-223
  4. ^ Schiff p. 224-225
  5. ^ a b c d Hesi Karmel, Intelligence for peace: the role of intelligence in times of peace, Frank Cass (1999) p.56
  6. ^ Michael Oren, Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli war, Egypt, Israel and the Great Powers, Frank Cass (1992), p.25
  7. ^ Benny Morris, Righteous victims: a history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881-1999, Vintage (1999, 2001) p. 283
  8. ^ Spencer, 1162
  9. ^ Morris, (1999) p. 283
  10. ^ Zeʼev Derori, Israel's reprisal policy, 1953-1956: the dynamics of military retaliation, Frank Cass (2005) p. 152
  11. ^ Schiff (1974) p. 227-228